DR 97-014
                                     
                  Public Service Company of New Hampshire
                                     
                Fuel and Purchased Power Adjustment Clause
                                     
                     Order Addressing Disputed Issues
                                     
                          O R D E R  N O.  22,847
                                     
                             February 10, 1998
     
         APPEARANCES:  Gerald M. Eaton, Esq. for Public Service
     Company of New Hampshire; Dean, Rice and Howard by Anne Davidson,
     Esq. for the New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc.; James T.
     Rodier, Esq. for Freedom Energy Company, LLC; Campaign for
     Ratepayers Rights by Representative Robert Cushing; the New
     Hampshire Department of Justice by Wynn E. Arnold, Esq. and
     Martin P. Honigberg, Esq. for Governor Jeanne Shaheen; Office of
     Consumer Advocate by Michael W. Holmes, Esq. for residential
     ratepayers; and Eugene F. Sullivan III, Esq. for the Staff of the
     New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission.
     
     I.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               Following a March 5, 1997 prehearing conference, Public
     Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH), on March 14, 1997, filed
     with the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (Commission) a
     petition for an adjustment of rates pursuant to the Fuel and
     Purchased Power Adjustment Clause (FPPAC) for the period from
     June 1, 1997 through November 30, 1997.  PSNH filed testimony and
     exhibits in support of its request to change the FPPAC rate from
     a credit of $0.00848 (8.48 mils) per kWh to a charge of $0.00118
     (1.18 mils) per kWh, which constitutes an increase of $0.00966
     (9.66 mils) per kWh or approximately an 8% increase in rates.
     
               On March 24, 1997, the Commission issued Order No.
     22,529 which, among other things, set a procedural schedule to
     govern the Commission's investigation into the proposed FPPAC
     rate, granted the New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc.'s
     (NHEC) Motion to Intervene, and granted a motion by PSNH to defer
     consideration of the prudence of certain nuclear outages and the
     recovery of the corresponding replacement power costs incurred as
     a result of those outages. 
               On April 7, 1997, the Commission granted the late filed
     Motion to Intervene of Freedom Energy Company, LLC (Freedom). On
     September 5, 1997 the Campaign for Ratepayers Rights (CRR) filed
     a Motion to Intervene that was granted by secretarial letter on
     October 2, 1997.  The Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA) is a
     statutorily authorized intervenor.
               On May 2, 1997, the OCA filed the testimony of Kenneth
     E. Traum and Commission Staff (Staff) filed the joint testimony
     of Chester A. Kokoszka, James R. Thyng and Scott J. Joyce.  On
     May 7, 1997 Staff filed the testimony of Michael D. Cannata, Jr.
     and Eugene F. Sullivan, Jr.
     
               On May 9, 1997, four days prior to the scheduled
     hearings on the merits in this proceeding, PSNH filed a Motion to
     Suspend the FPPAC proceeding.  PSNH asserted the suspension was
     necessary because it had to dedicate the resources normally
     expended on FPPAC to attempt to mediate a resolution to its
     federal court lawsuit filed against the Commissioners as a result
     of the plan issued in the electric restructuring docket.  PSNH
     also requested that the FPPAC credit of 8.48 mils be reduced to
     4.81 mils because the revenues required to be deferred under
     Paragraph B.(K) of the FPPAC formula had been returned to
     ratepayers.  See,  Order No. 22,234 (July 10, 1996).  
               By Order No. 22,604, the Commission granted PSNH's
     request to suspend the proceeding until July 2, 1997, and to
     increase the FPPAC rate by reducing the 8.48 mil credit to a 4.81
     mil credit.
               On July 2, 1997, PSNH, with the support of a majority
     of the parties to the aforementioned mediation process, again
     requested that the Commission continue to stay the proceeding and
     maintain the FPPAC credit placed in effect by Order No. 22,604
     until August 5, 1997.     
               Because of the support for the continued stay expressed
     by a majority of the parties, and because there was no immediate
     need to move forward with the process given that the FPPAC rate
     is subject to reconciliation, the Commission granted the
     requested relief.  The Commission scheduled a hearing for August
     4, 1997, to consider what future actions should be taken after
     August 5, 1997.  Order No. 22,665 (July 21, 1997).
               On August 1, 1997, PSNH filed another motion to
     continue the suspension of the docket beyond August 5, 1997.  On
     August 4, 1997, the Commission heard from the parties to the
     mediation regarding the status of the mediation and granted a
     further suspension until September 2, 1997.  The Commission also
     scheduled a prehearing conference for September 11, 1997 to
     develop a new procedural schedule, as the mediation process was
     expected to be concluded by that point.
               On September 10, 1997, PSNH filed a request to increase
     the FPPAC rate, effective October 1, 1997, pursuant to the
     "trigger mechanism" established by the Commission in Order No.
     20,794 (March 23, 1993).  Re Public Service Company of New
     Hampshire, 78 NH PUC 149 (1993).  PSNH stated it anticipated an
     under-recovery of approximately $15 million as of December 1,
     1997, and that increasing the FPPAC rate from a credit of
     $0.00481 per kWh to a charge of $0.0 would reduce the under-recovery to $10 million by December 1, 1997. 
     
               A number of parties and Staff opposed the request for a
     separate rate adjustment under the trigger mechanism given that
     the full FPPAC rate was scheduled to be investigated, reviewed
     and set on December 1, 1997.  The Commission denied PSNH's
     request to increase the FPPAC rate under the trigger mechanism,
     stating its preference to entertain potential changes to the
     FPPAC rate in one proceeding.  Order No. 22,769 (October 27,
     1997).  Thus, this proceeding addresses issues that were to be
     heard in May of 1997 and issues that have arisen since that time.
               On November 12, 1997, PSNH filed an Objection and
     Motion to Strike Portions of the Pre-filed Testimony of the
     Campaign for Ratepayer Rights relating to Pollution Control
     Revenue Bonds (PCRBs), an Objection and Motion to Strike Portions
     of Pre-filed Testimony of Kenneth E. Traum as it related to the
     sale of Seabrook Unit II parts, and an Objection and Motion to
     Strike the Pre-filed Testimony of George McCluskey Related to the
     Topic of Light Loading and the Pre-filed Testimony of Michael D.
     Cannata, Jr. Related to the Topic of Light Loading, Pollution
     Control Revenue Bonds and Best Efforts. On November 13, 1997, the
     Office of the Governor filed an Objection to PSNH's Motion to
     Strike Testimony of George McCluskey.  On November 17, 1997,
     Granite State Hydropower Assoc., Inc. also entered an Objection
     to the Acceptance by the Commission of Testimony submitted by
     George McCluskey and Michael D. Cannata, Jr. on the issue of
     Light Loading.  After hearing oral arguments, the Commission
     denied the motions to strike. 
               Hearings were held November 14, 17, 19, and 22, 1997;  
     post-hearing briefs were filed on November 25, 1997, by PSNH, the
     Office of the Governor, CRR, OCA, and Staff.  The Commission
     orally deliberated the issues in dispute on December 1, 1997 and
     issued Order No. 22,797 (December 3, 1997) implementing an FPPAC
     rate of  2.66 mils which reflected the December 1, 1997
     deliberations.  
     
     II.  POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AND STAFF
     1. (a)  Capacity Transfer Agreement
          A.  Public Service Company of New Hampshire
               PSNH maintained that the $27.4 million it received from
     Connecticut Light and Power (CL&P) for the transfer of capacity
     from PSNH to CL&P under the Capacity Transfer Agreement was not
     an FPPAC issue, but was rather a base rate issue that should be
     addressed in its base rate filing.  Apparently, PSNH took this
     position because the majority of the costs of the fossil fuel
     capacity transferred to CL&P are recovered through base rates.
               Notwithstanding this position, PSNH argued that the
     FPPAC rate must include the carrying costs and the operation and
     maintenance expenses of the share of Seabrook capacity
     transferred to CL&P, and "EA" amortization and operation and
     maintenance expenses and the fuel costs associated with the share
     of the fossil fired capacity transferred to CL&P under the
     Capacity Transfer Agreement. 
               PSNH also maintained that PSNH ratepayers must bear the
     $10 million in increased power production costs, commonly
     referred to as a production penalty cost, resulting from this
     transfer of capacity through the FPPAC rate.  PSNH contended that
     Paragraph 4 of the Joint Recommendations of the State and
     Northeast Utilities (NU) in DR 89-244, which was entered into to
     address concerns raised by Staff relative to capacity sales and
     production penalty costs, was inapplicable to this capacity
     transfer.  PSNH argued that because the Capacity Transfer
     Agreement was executed by PSNH and CL&P on May 14, 1991 and
     Paragraph 4 states that the FPPAC rate would not include
     production penalty costs incurred for contracts entered into
     after the First Effective Date, May 16, 1991, the Joint
     Recommendation was inapplicable to this capacity sale.
          B.  Office of the Governor
               The Office of the Governor generally stated its support
     for  the positions of the Staff and the OCA on this issue. 
          C.  Office of the Consumer Advocate
               The OCA concurred with the position taken by Staff that
     the revenues from the capacity transfer should flow through FPPAC
     to ratepayers.  The OCA argued that because ratepayers are
     bearing all of the costs of generation of the transferred
     capacity, ratepayers were entitled to all of the benefits of the
     transfer.  Because the company proposed no change in base rates,
     the OCA argued that FPPAC was the only mechanism available to
     protect ratepayers. 
          D.   Freedom Energy Company   
               Based on his role as a Staff Utility Analyst in the
     review of the Rate Agreement in DR 89-244, Mr. Rodier testified
     that PSNH's request to recover the production penalty costs
     resulting from the sale of capacity to CL&P from ratepayers was
     entirely contrary to the "purpose, intent and understanding of
     the change effectuated to the Rate Agreement" by the Joint
     Recommendations.
          E.   Staff
               Staff argued that the revenues from the capacity
     transfer should flow through FPPAC because the production penalty
     costs, all of the costs of the Seabrook Power Contract, and the
     fuel and Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA) costs of fossil
     generation were being passed on to ratepayers through FPPAC. 
     Staff argued that the FPPAC formula could be construed in a
     manner that would provide a mechanism to compensate ratepayers. 
     Staff also noted that the Commission had plenary ratemaking
     authority under RSA 378:7 to equitably compensate ratepayers for
     this capacity transfer.  
     1. (b) Rate Agreement Breach  
          A.   Public Service Company of New Hampshire
               PSNH argued that it had not breached the Rate Agreement
     as alleged by Staff.  With regard to NU's filing of a network
     transmission tariff at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
     (FERC) which resulted in PSNH's loss of millions of dollars in
     transmission revenues from the Initial System, PSNH maintained
     that FERC Orders 888 and 888-A required the filings.  PSNH
     further maintained that Section 11 of the Capacity Transfer
     Agreement requires that the Agreement be in accordance with the
     orders of the FERC and, therefore, there was no breach.
               With regard to Staff's contention that NU had not
     maintained its pledged units in accordance with good electric
     utility practices as required under the Capacity Transfer
     Agreement, PSNH responded that the loss of Millstone III was the
     only relevant unit affecting the Capacity Transfer Agreement, and
     that the loss of this capacity to PSNH had been addressed as per
     the terms of the Capacity Transfer Agreement.
               PSNH did not address Staff's allegation with regard to
     the proposed modifications to the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL)
     agreement filed with the FERC and the consequent ramifications to
     the Rate Agreement.   
          B.  Office of the Governor
               The Office of the Governor generally stated its support
     for the positions of the Staff and the OCA on this issue. 
          C.  Office of the Consumer Advocate
               The OCA supported the position taken by Staff that NU
     had breached the Sharing Agreement and, therefore, the Rate
     Agreement.  
               D.  Staff
               Staff argued that NU had engaged in a course of conduct
     effectively resulting in a breach of the Rate Agreement.  Staff's
     argument centered on Section 3 of the Rate Agreement and Section
     4 of the Rate Agreement and the Sharing Agreement, and the
     Capacity Transfer Agreements appended thereto, which it
     maintained were fundamental bases underlying the Rate Agreement.
               Staff raised three areas which it alleged constituted a
     course of conduct by NU amounting to a breach of the Rate
     Agreement.  First, Staff alleged that NU committed in Section 3
     of the Rate Agreement to maintain sufficient capacity to assure
     New Hampshire ratepayers an adequate supply of power.  To
     accomplish this end, NU agreed to maintain certain pledged
     generating units in accordance with good utility practice.  Three
     of the pledged units are Millstone Point Units I, II and III
     which comprise approximately 40% of the pledged capacity.  Given
     that both internal and external investigations of the Millstone
     outages concluded the outages were the result of negligent
     management of the Units, Staff concluded that NU had failed to
     meet this obligation.  Staff also argued that the loss of
     Millstone III may also have affected revenues to be paid to PSNH
     under the current capacity transfer, and may also have affected
     the production penalty cost resulting from that capacity
     transfer. 
               Second, NU unilaterally filed a network transmission
     tariff with the FERC resulting in the loss of millions of dollars
     to PSNH ratepayers in transmission fees from the NU Initial
     System while maintaining that PSNH must continue to pay millions
     of dollars in transmission fees to the Initial System regardless
     of the new network transmission tariff.  
               Third, NU, as a member of NEPOOL, with the ability to
     exercise substantial control over that entity, supported a filing
     with the FERC by NEPOOL that would effectively void the Sharing
     Agreement and its Capacity Transfer Agreements.
               With regard to the second and third items, Staff argued
     that NU had a contractual obligation to meet with the State to
     attempt to negotiate new arrangements that would provide both the
     State and NU with the benefit of their initial bargains, which NU
     failed to do.  Staff concluded that these actions, when viewed in
     their entirety, or as a course of conduct, amounted to bad faith
     on NU's part and a breach of the Rate Agreement.   
     2.  Treatment of "EA" Costs Following the Fixed Rate Period
               PSNH and Staff concurred that certain costs currently
     being recovered through "EA" of FPPAC could be recovered through
     either FPPAC or base rates.  Alternatively, PSNH argued that
     should the Commission determine that such costs are more
     appropriately collected through base rates, it should be allowed
     to recover the incremental costs of the CAAA through FPPAC.
     3.  Best Efforts
          A.  Public Service Company of New Hampshire
               PSNH asserted that the State had conceded PSNH
     exercised its "best efforts" to renegotiate certain Small Power
     Producer (SPP) agreements under Section 12 of the Rate Agreement,
     and, therefore, there was no need to defer recovery of portions
     of current and deferred SPP costs as there was no longer any
     contractual obligation to fulfill.     
               Assuming, for the sake of argument, there was the
     possibility of a best efforts breach, PSNH argued that the
     deferrals that occurred during the Fixed Rate Period constituted
     sufficient security to ratepayers should the Commission determine
     PSNH had not exercised its best efforts under the Rate Agreement. 
          B.  Office of the Governor
               The Office of the Governor took no position on this
     issue at this time.  It did, however, take issue with PSNH's
     characterization of any best efforts concessions by the State.
     
     
          C.  Office of the Consumer Advocate
               The OCA argued that the Commission should not allow
     PSNH to recover a portion of current SPP costs and a portion of
     deferred SPP costs because it is apparent PSNH did not exercise
     best efforts with regard to these costs.  Thus, the OCA concluded
     the Commission should defer recovery of some of these costs until
     final resolution of the issues in DR 96-148.    
          D.  Staff
               Staff took the position that PSNH had not satisfied its
     best efforts obligations.  Staff specifically noted that PSNH
     could have easily financed the renegotiated agreement with Bio-Energy Corp. with retained earnings rather than paying an $85
     million dividend to its Connecticut parent and, notwithstanding
     the dividend, still had sufficient cash to consummate the
     renegotiated agreement.  Staff also noted that the Commission had
     considered the State's concessions with regard to best efforts
     and found that those concessions were merely evidence of
     compliance with the best efforts obligation that the Commission
     would consider in rendering its ultimate decision on this issue.
               Given the level of SPP deferrals at this time, however,
     Staff did not see the need to defer recovery of any additional
     SPP costs for purposes of dealing with best efforts.
     4.  Light Loading 
          A. Public Service Company of New Hampshire
               PSNH objected to the testimony of Messrs. McCluskey and
     Cannata recommending, respectively, that the Commission defer
     recovery of between $20 million to $50 million to be paid to
     SPPs, or Qualifying Facilities (QF), on a prospective basis over
     the next year.
               PSNH argued that Messrs. McCluskey and Cannata had
     misinterpreted a response to a data request in DR 94-080 that
     indicated PSNH was annually paying $20 million to the State's
     SPPs for power provided to PSNH during periods of light loading.  
               Specifically, PSNH argued that "negative avoided costs"
     had been included in its calculation of the stream of payments to
     SPPs under the long term rate orders.  PSNH also argued that
     Messrs. McCluskey and Cannata had misinterpreted the term
     "operational circumstances" under FERC rules that would justify
     suspension or curtailment of purchases during periods of minimal
     load conditions, also known as light loading periods.    
          B.  Office of the Governor
               As alluded to above, Mr. McCluskey testified that the
     Commission should defer PSNH's recovery through FPPAC of $20
     million paid to QFs because payments in that amount may not have
     been required under 18 C.F.R. 292.304(f).  
               Mr. McCluskey testified that 292.304(f) provides that
     utilities are allowed to curtail deliveries of power by QFs
     during periods of "light (i.e., low) loads" because purchases
     during these periods would result in negative avoided costs, 
     that is, during periods where the QFs would be required to pay
     utilities for the power delivered.  To avoid this anomalous
     result, Mr. McCluskey testified the FERC adopted 292.304(f)
     which provides that utilities should cease purchases from QFs
     during these periods.
               Relying on a data response from PSNH in DR 94-080 that
     quantified the amount of money expended annually by PSNH in
     payments to QFs during light load periods, Mr. McCluskey
     recommended the Commission defer recovery of $20 million.  Mr.
     McCluskey further testified that the inclusion, or lack thereof,
     of negative avoided costs in the calculation of long term rates
     granted QFs had no effect on his analysis or his conclusions with
     regard to the ramifications of 292.304(f). 
          C.  Staff
               Mr. Cannata concurred with Mr. McCluskey that, pursuant
     to 292.304(f), a prudent utility should be and should have been
     curtailing delivery of power from QFs during periods of light
     load.  Staff concluded that the annual figure of $20 million
     arrived at by PSNH in DR 94-080, however, was in reality closer
     to $30 million if the effects of lost joint dispatch savings were
     included in the calculation of the revenue impact of QF purchases
     during light load periods.  
               Staff further testified that PSNH miscalculated the
     revenue impact of QF purchases by PSNH during light load periods,
     thereby understating the cost to ratepayers, because PSNH did not
     include all of its base load plants in arriving at the $20
     million figure.  Mr. Cannata testified that the inclusion of all
     base load plants would increase the $30 million figure to
     approximately $50 million.     
               Mr. Cannata based his conclusion that PSNH should have
     been curtailing purchases from QFs during light load periods on
     PSNH's inability to establish that negative avoided costs were
     included in the long term avoided cost calculations used to
     derive the rates paid QFs in New Hampshire.  Mr. Cannata
     testified that he had requested information from PSNH that would
     have resolved this issue, but PSNH had responded that it could
     not find, or it had destroyed, the requested information.             Mr. Cannata indicated that Mr. McCluskey's testimony
     raised some interesting points he had not considered relative to
     "operational circumstances" and "light loading" when negative
     avoided costs are included in the development of long term
     avoided cost rates.  Given the limited time frame for
     consideration of this position, however, he testified he did not
     feel comfortable taking any position regarding that testimony.
     5.   Unit II Parts   
          A.  Public Service Company of New Hampshire
               PSNH objected to the fact that the OCA had, once again, 
     raised the issue of the appropriate treatment of revenues from
     the sale of Seabrook Unit II parts such as the Unit II steam
     generators.  PSNH argued that the Commission had conclusively
     determined in dockets DR 97-042 and DR 96-285 that Seabrook Unit
     II parts were the property of shareholders, and that any profits
     realized from the sale of these parts belong exclusively to
     shareholders.  Re Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 80 NH
     PUC 586 (1995);  Re Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 81
     NH PUC 1034 (1996).
               Assuming, arguendo, that the issue was appropriately
     before the Commission, PSNH reiterated the positions it took in
     those earlier dockets.  PSNH argued that pursuant to the Rate
     Agreement, the entire value of "old PSNH's" ownership share of
     Seabrook Unit I and abandoned Unit II, $700 million, had been
     allocated to Unit I, and, therefore, Unit II was the unregulated
     property of the shareholders of North Atlantic Energy Company
     (NAECo), a wholly owned subsidiary of NU.  NAECo owns all of
     PSNH's former share of Seabrook.
               In support of its position PSNH noted that it had not
     collected any of North Atlantic Energy Service Company's (NAESCo)
     share of the protect and preserve costs of Unit II parts through
     the Seabrook Power Contract.  PSNH also argued that the Seabrook
     Power Contract contains no provision for the recovery of these
     expenses from PSNH and its ratepayers and, therefore, the parts
     are logically the sole property of shareholders under the Rate
     Agreement. 
          B.  Office of the Consumer Advocate
               The OCA argued that ratepayers are currently paying for
     Unit II parts because $700 million was the value assigned to
     Seabrook Station, Units I and II under the Rate Agreement.  The
     OCA contended that the $700 million was not allocated to Unit I
     for the purposes of the Seabrook Power Contract, but rather that
     the Contract included both Units I and II.  Thus, the OCA
     concluded that the revenue from the sale of Unit II parts, such
     as the steam generators, should be returned to ratepayers.  
               C.  Office of the Governor
               The Office of the Governor concurred with the position
     taken by the OCA and expressed concerns raised relative to the
     tax consequences of Unit II part sales to PSNH.
          D.  Staff
               Staff indicated that the majority of Staff supported
     the position of the OCA and requested that the Commission take
     administrative notice of the testimonies and positions of the
     Finance Director, Eugene F. Sullivan, Jr, and the Chief Engineer,
     Michael D. Cannata, Jr., in DR 94-172.  Administrative notice was
     taken without objection. 
               In DR 94-172 the Commission's Engineering Staff and
     Finance Staff took divergent positions on this issue.  Mr.
     Cannata recommended that the Commission establish an "imprudence
     mitigation fund" to recognize the extraordinary performance of 
     NAESCo, a wholly owned subsidiary of NU that operates Seabrook
     Station, in operating Seabrook Unit I.  Mr. Cannata argued that
     an essential element of this extraordinary performance was
     NAESCo's preservation and maintenance of NAECo's abandoned Unit
     II parts without compensation.  Mr. Cannata represented that the
     maintenance and preservation of these parts had resulted in
     unrecognized value to PSNH ratepayers by reducing the amount of
     time Seabrook would be down because of the availability of these
     parts. 
               Mr. Cannata proposed that the imprudence mitigation
     fund be financed from the savings accruing to PSNH ratepayers
     because of the availability and use of Unit II parts in Unit I. 
     Thus, Mr. Cannata concluded that the parts were not part of the
     $700 million allocated to Seabrook Station under the Seabrook
     Power Contract.
               Mr. Sullivan recommended that the Commission recognize
     the value of Unit II parts by a pass through of NAECo's share of
     the revenues from the sale of Unit II parts to PSNH ratepayers
     through the Seabrook Power Contract.  Mr. Sullivan also
     recommended that it was inappropriate to capitalize Unit II parts
     as they were placed in service in Unit I.  Mr. Sullivan based
     these recommendations on the language in the Rate Agreement that
     assigned a $700 million value to "all" of the assets at Seabrook
     Station, which included Unit II and its parts, and because the
     entire $700 million, paid for both Units, had been allocated to
     Unit I for the purposes of the Seabrook Power Contract. 
          6.   Pollution Control Revenue Bonds
          A.   Public Service Company of New Hampshire
               In response to CRR's contention that the lower cost of
     debt on certain tax exempt Pollution Control Revenue Bonds
     (PCRBs) comprising a part of PSNH's capital structure should be
     imputed to NAECo's capital structure for the purposes of the
     Seabrook Power Contract during the Fixed Rate Period, PSNH raised
     a number of arguments in opposition to this position.
               Initially, PSNH argued that the Seabrook Power Contract
     was a FERC filed contract that required the pass through of
     NAECo's actual cost of capital that could not be displaced by
     this Commission under the filed rate doctrine.  PSNH also argued
     that the Commission had fully reviewed and approved the
     financings and capital structures at issue herein under RSA 369
     and 362-C in DR 89-244 in approving the Rate Agreement.  PSNH
     also contended that because of time constraints these bonds had
     to be issued in the name of PSNH prior to the creation of NAECo
     to meet the timing requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, and
     that under the terms of the notes they could not be transferred
     to NAECo.  Finally, PSNH noted that the lower cost of debt of
     these notes will be reflected in PSNH's cost of capital in the
     current base rate proceeding.  
          B.   Office of the Governor
               The Office of the Governor objected to the fact that
     PSNH had failed to respond to four of CRR's data requests
     relating to the PCRBs by the conclusion of the hearings in this
     matter.  The Office of the Governor repeated a concern raised by
     Staff that PSNH was failing to supply complete and accurate
     information to the Commission and the parties in what appeared to
     be a course of conduct designed to withhold financially
     detrimental information.      
               Based on available data, the Office of the Governor
     concurred in CRR's position and recommended the Commission impute
     the lower cost of capital to the Seabrook Power Contract and pass
     those savings on to ratepayers. 
          C.   Campaign for Ratepayers Rights
               CRR argued that the proceeds from the low interest, tax
     exempt PCRB bonds issued by the New Hampshire Industrial
     Development Authority and its successor agency, the Business
     Finance Authority (hereinafter referred to jointly as the BFA),
     were inappropriately and illegally retained within the capital
     structure of PSNH when the assets for which they were issued were
     spun off to create NAECo.  
                    CRR maintained that the PCRBs were issued to finance
     qualifying pollution control facilities at Seabrook Station and 
     that absent those facilities, these tax exempt bonds could not
     have been issued.  Thus, the PCRBs equitably and legally belonged
     in the capital structure of NAECo and not PSNH.  
               CRR contended that had these bonds been placed in
     NAECo's capital structure, ratepayers, rather than shareholders,
     would have received the benefit of lower interest rates during
     the Fixed Rate Period and that the Commission should impute those 
     savings back to ratepayers.
          D.   Office Of The Consumer Advocate
               The OCA shared CRR's belief that it was inappropriate
     for PSNH to hold tax exempt PCRBs when it no longer owns the
     pollution control facilities which were the basis for the
     issuance of the bonds.  The OCA suggested the Commission order
     PSNH to request a letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service
     (IRS) concerning the tax exempt status of the bonds.
     
               The OCA recommended that the Commission impute to the
     Seabrook Power Contract $212.5 million in lower capital costs
     garnered by PSNH during the Fixed Rate Period and require PSNH to
     refund those monies to ratepayers.   
          E.   Staff
               Staff concurred with PSNH's conclusion that the
     Commission had approved the proposed capital structure of PSNH
     and NAECo following the divestiture of Seabrook in DR 89-244
     which included leaving $100 million in PCRBs in the capital
     structure of PSNH.  Staff further noted that both the Governor
     and Council were explicitly informed by PSNH that all of the tax
     benefits of the additional PCRBs would flow to PSNH during the
     Fixed Rate Period and ratepayers thereafter.
     7.   Replacement Power Costs Incurred as a Result of Outages
          at Maine Yankee, Vermont Yankee and Connecticut Yankee
     
          A.  Public Service Company of New Hampshire
               PSNH objected to the disallowance of replacement power
     costs at Connecticut Yankee as recommended by Staff.  PSNH
     maintained Staff had not provided sufficient evidence to support
     its recommendation that all replacement power costs be disallowed
     for the outage that commenced when Connecticut Yankee shut down
     to address the design flaw with the Containment Air Recirculation
     (CAR) fans and concluded with Connecticut Yankee's decision to
     permanently shut down and decommission the plant.
               PSNH argued that its witness, Thomas Dente, had
     established that Connecticut Yankee acted appropriately in
     addressing the CAR outage and in moving up the refueling of the
     Unit while the CAR problem was addressed.  PSNH further argued
     that Staff had failed to establish NAESCo acted imprudently, or
     negligently, with regard to the cause or duration of the outage.
               PSNH also objected to the recommended $11,000
     replacement power disallowance for alleged imprudence at Vermont
     Yankee.  PSNH argued that although Vermont Yankee personnel
     admittedly acted imprudently in failing to follow standard
     procedures, thereby causing the outage, a disallowance was
     inappropriate because there was no management imprudence. 
               With regard to the Maine Yankee outage which commenced
     with the discovery of cable separation problems and, again,
     concluded with a decision to permanently shut down and
     decommission the unit, PSNH argued that it was necessary to
     refuel the plant and the decision to decommission the plant was
     made during that time period.  Thus, any period for disallowance
     of replacement power costs should conclude with the beginning of
     the refueling outage which lasted until the decision to shut down
     was made.  
          B.  Office of the Governor
               The Office of the Governor supported Staff's
     recommendation that the Commission disallow the recovery of $2.9
     million in replacement power costs because the power costs were
     incurred as a result of the imprudent operation of the Maine
     Yankee, Vermont Yankee and Connecticut Yankee nuclear generating
     stations.
          C.  Office of the Consumer Advocate
               The OCA supported Staff's recommended disallowances.
          D.  Staff
               Staff took the position that all replacement power
     costs for the outage that commenced when Connecticut Yankee came
     down to address the design flaw with the CAR fans and concluded
     with Connecticut Yankee's decision to permanently shut down and
     decommission the plant should be disallowed.  Staff based its
     position on the belief that the problem with the CAR fans should
     have been addressed earlier than it was, and that this delay,
     along with a number of other problems that were discovered while
     the plant was down, led to the conclusion to decommission the
     unit.  
                    Staff took the position that the replacement power
     costs incurred for the outage at Vermont Yankee should be
     disallowed because the outage was due to the admitted negligence
     of Vermont Yankee personnel.  Staff maintained that the fact that
     the personnel were adequately trained and that management was not
     involved in the negligent conduct were irrelevant to a
     determination of whether shareholders or ratepayers should bear
     the risk of employee negligence.  Staff maintained that
     shareholders should bear the risk of negligent conduct by their
     agents.
               Staff also argued that all replacement power costs
     incurred as a result of the Maine Yankee outage should be
     disallowed.  Staff maintained, and PSNH concurred, that Maine
     Yankee was required to come down when it was discovered that the
     control room had cable separation problems.  In particular, it
     was discovered that the cables for the redundant manual trip
     buttons in the control room shared the same cable train.  Thus,
     an accident affecting this single cable train might eliminate
     both redundant systems.  Once the unit came down to repair this
     particular problem, a number of other cable separation problems
     for redundant systems were identified.  Given the time that would
     be required to identify and correct these problems, the decision
     was made to refuel the plant.  Subsequently, the decision was
     made by the owners to shut down and decommission the unit because
     it was no longer economic to operate.
               Staff contended that subsequent to a fire at one of the
     nuclear units located at Brown's Ferry in 1975 in which redundant
     systems were threatened by the same event due to the proximity of
     the cables operating the redundant systems, nuclear plants
     throughout the country were required to identify and separate
     cables for redundant systems to avoid this particular problem. 
     Staff also testified that in 1990 and again in 1992 Maine Yankee
     was required to clean up some of its control room wiring problems
     and that had those efforts been conducted prudently, this
     particular outage would not have occurred.   
     8.   Merrimack and Schiller Stations' Coal Pile Reconciliation
               Subsequent to the hearings in this matter, the OCA,
     PSNH and the Staff submitted the final reconciliation of the
     amount of coal held in inventory at Merrimack and Schiller
     Stations.  Consequently, this issue is no longer in contention.
          9.   Seabrook Station Science Center
          A.  Public Service Company of New Hampshire
               PSNH maintained that the costs associated with the
     Science and Nature Center (Center) should be included in rates
     because the Center was used and useful in the production of
     power.  PSNH maintained that although the Center does contain
     exhibits on nuclear power and Seabrook Station for students and
     members of the general public, the building is also used for
     training and meetings.  NAESCo testified that the building
     contains an auditorium that seats 100 people which is the only
     facility large enough to conduct a meeting of all of the plant's
     department heads.  PSNH also noted that the Commission had
     specifically ruled that the Center should not be disallowed from
     PSNH ratebase on two prior occasions. 
          B.  Campaign for Ratepayers Rights
               CRR claimed that the Center was not intended to be
     included in the costs passed on to PSNH ratepayers because it was
     not included in Schedule I of the Seabrook Power Contract.
               CRR also argued that the Center was a "mini theme park"
     that should not be included in rates because it was not
     functionally related to the generation of power for customers.
     
          C.  Office of the Consumer Advocate
               The OCA argued that the Center was designed and
     maintained for public relations purposes, and was therefore
     operated to promote nuclear power's and the owner's image. 
     Without criticizing either goal the OCA noted that these were
     inappropriate costs to collect from ratepayers. 
     10.  Appropriate Methodology for Calculating Replacement Power   Cost Incurred as a Result of Imprudence
     
          A.  Public Service Company of New Hampshire
               PSNH maintained that the Commission's methodology for
     calculating replacement power costs incurred as a result of
     imprudent outages at generating units was inequitable, unjust and
     unreasonable.  PSNH argued that in calculating replacement power
     costs the Commission should utilize a net economic harm test.
               In applying this test to an imprudent outage, the
     Commission would be required to subtract from replacement power
     costs to be disallowed any benefits PSNH ratepayers received from
     the outage, such as, joint dispatch savings under the Sharing
     Agreement or capacity revenues under the Capacity Transfer
     Agreement. 
          B.  Office of the Governor
               The Office of the Governor argued that PSNH should not
     be allowed to recover any replacement power costs incurred as a
     result of imprudence.  
          C.  Office of the Consumer Advocate
               The OCA argued that the Commission had already
     addressed and rejected PSNH's proposed "net economic harm" test. 
     The OCA argued that each event, the imprudent operation of the
     plant in question and the ability to sell power to the majority
     owner of a unit, should be addressed discretely.
          D.  Staff
               Staff made the same arguments set forth in the position
     of the OCA above.
     11.  Appropriate Calculation of "BA" Following
          the Fixed Rate Period
     
               All of the parties and Staff concurred that the "BA",
     or "Base Assumptions" component of FPPAC, must be consistent with
     the value set for this component in base rates.  Thus, the
     computation of "BA" should have no effect on overall rates.
     12.  North Atlantic Energy Company, Inc.'s Purchase of the  Vermont Electric Generation and Transmission Cooperative,   Inc.'s Share of Seabrook and Harbor Seals
          A.  Public Service Company of New Hampshire
               PSNH maintained that the purchase of Vermont Electric
     Generation and Transmission Cooperative, Inc.'s (VEG&T) 0.4129%
     share of Seabrook Station and its inclusion in the Seabrook Power
     Contract did not violate RSA 362-C as alleged by CRR.  PSNH
     maintained it agreed to purchase VEG&T's share of Seabrook
     through its affiliate, NAECo, in settlement of a claim in the
     VEG&T bankruptcy.  
               PSNH argued that the State and PSNH agreed to a
     modification to the Seabrook Power Contract and, therefore, the
     Rate Agreement that provided for NAECo's purchase of the 0.4129%
     VEG&T share of Seabrook and an agreement by PSNH to purchase the
     entire output of that share in accordance with the terms of the
     Seabrook Power Contract.  The Agreement between the State and
     PSNH to modify the Rate Agreement was subject to the condition
     that NAECo's purchase of the VEG&T share of Seabrook and its
     subsequent sale to PSNH would not increase rates to PSNH
     ratepayers during the Fixed Rate Period.  PSNH concluded that
     because there could be no change in rates during the Fixed Rate
     Period, and any increase in rates would occur after the Fixed
     Rate Period, there was no violation of the provisions of RSA 362-C:9.  
               With regard to the fouling of the cooling tunnels with
     the carcasses of dead harbor seals caught in the intake of the
     cooling tunnels when the seals venture into the tunnel openings,
     PSNH testified that this has only recently become a problem with
     the resurgence of the harbor seal population in the Gulf of
     Maine.  Thus, this was not a design flaw as the harbor seal was
     not perceived as a problem at the time of the design and
     construction of the cooling tunnels.
          B.  Campaign For Ratepayers Rights 
               CRR objected to ratepayers bearing the cost of the
     VEG&T share of Seabrook, which commenced at the conclusion of the
     Fixed Rate Period, June 1, 1997, because it violated the
     provisions of RSA 362-C:9.
               CRR also asked for a disallowance of any costs
     associated with remedying the harbor seal problem as it was a
     design flaw in the construction of the plant.  Thus, ratepayers
     should not be required to bear the expense of this negligence.
     
     III.  COMMISSION ANALYSIS
               Given the numerous issues raised in this proceeding, we
     will address each issue separately in the order that it was
     briefed by the parties and Staff.
     1.(A) Capacity Transfer Agreement Revenues
               As a result of the nuclear outages in Connecticut,
     effective November 1, 1997, CL&P was unable to meet its capacity
     capability responsibilities under the rules of NEPOOL.  Pursuant
     to one of the Capacity Transfer Agreements entered into between
     PSNH and CL&P, which is appended to the Sharing Agreement, CL&P
     was required to buy a proportional slice of PSNH's excess
     generating capacity whenever CL&P is unable to meet its NEPOOL
     capacity obligations.  The designated percentage of PSNH unit
     capacity to be transferred under the Agreement is as follows:  
          Seabrook            20.0%
          Millstone III       10.0%
          Merrimack I          7.0%
          Merrimack II        18.0%
          Schiller 4           5.0%
          Schiller 5           5.0%
          Schiller 6           5.0%
          Newington           20.0%
          Gas Turbines        10.0%
          Total              100.0%
     
     Exhibit 41 at 9.  CL&P paid PSNH $27.4 million for the transfer
     of this capacity and its attendant energy.  
               As is set forth above, the dispute in this case is the
     appropriate rate treatment of the $27.4 million paid to PSNH in
     compensation for the transfer of capacity to CL&P.  PSNH argued
     that the revenues were appropriately booked to base rate revenues
     because the FPPAC formula did not include a provision for the
     flow back of capacity transfer revenues to ratepayers and,
     presumably, because the majority of the generation comprising the
     transfer is booked to base rates.  The other parties to the
     proceeding argued that the FPPAC formula could be construed in a
     manner to provide a mechanism to flow these revenues through to
     ratepayers.  They also argued that, although a majority of this
     generating capacity is booked to base rates, it would be
     inequitable to book the revenues to base rates because ratepayers
     would never see the benefits of the transfer and shareholders
     would receive a windfall due to the mechanics of the historic
     test year used in traditional ratemaking methodology.
               We concur with these parties and Staff.  Thus, we have
     concluded that the only equitable, just and reasonable treatment
     of the capacity transfer revenues is to pass the revenues back to
     ratepayers this FPPAC period through the FPPAC formula or, in the
     alternative, pursuant to our general ratemaking authority.
     Initially, we believe the FPPAC formula can be construed to
     provide for the flow-through of the capacity transfer revenues to
     ratepayers.  The FPPAC formula found at Rate Agreement at      
     p. D-91 reads as follows:
                            [[[Enf + PCf + EA]
          FPPAC rate =                               - BA] x SFT] + PA
                            [[[kWh Req X DE ]
     
     "PCF" is defined as the "forecasted purchased capacity expense", 
     Rate Agreement at D-91, and also as "[t]he capacity costs
     associated with other system power and unit contract capacity
     purchases . . . ."  Rate Agreement at D-103.  Although these
     definitions are written in affirmative language, there is no
     prohibition on a negative capacity expense, in other words "PCf"
     could be a negative number.  Thus, in this instance the purchased
     capacity expense would be a negative $27.4 million and placed in
     the FPPAC formula to lower the overall rate for fuel and
     purchased power to PSNH ratepayers.  
               We believe this is the only logical conclusion that can
     be reached where $10 million of production penalty costs caused
     by the capacity transfer, the fossil generation fuel costs, the
     entire cost of the Seabrook Power Contract and all of the costs
     of the CAAA are being passed on to ratepayers through the FPPAC
     formula.  
               With regard to any arguments that some of the costs of
     the transferred capacity are recovered through base rates and,
     therefore, the revenues should be passed through base rates, we
     note that any capacity purchase costs would not be borne through
     base rates but are FPPAC costs under "Enf".  Thus, we conclude
     there should be parity under the FPPAC formula for capacity
     purchases and sales.
               Assuming, arguendo, we were to accept PSNH's argument
     that these revenues, or some portion thereof, cannot be passed
     through the FPPAC formula to ratepayers and that these revenues
     should appropriately be taken into account as part of a base rate
     proceeding, the result would be a windfall to shareholders.  The
     capacity revenues would be booked more than a year out of test
     year for the current base rate proceeding.  Accordingly, the
     benefit of that revenue would not be captured for ratepayers.
               We believe this is inappropriate.  As the OCA correctly
     asserted, ratepayers are funding the generation resources that
     are the source of these capacity revenues, whether through base
     rates or the FPPAC rate and, therefore, equity requires that the
     revenues garnered from these resources be flowed through to
     ratepayers.  The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held on a number
     of occasions that the Commission's ratemaking authority under RSA
     378:7 is plenary and that the Commission has general ratemaking
     authority under RSA chapter 378 to implement the method in which
     rates are put into effect.  See, State v. New England Telephone
     and Telegraph Co., 103 N.H. 394, 397 (1961); Nelson v. Public
     Service Company of New Hampshire, 119 N.H. 327, 332 (1979). 
               Thus, to the extent the FPPAC formula does not
     accommodate the flow-through of capacity revenues, we will
     exercise our general ratemaking authority and flow-through the
     $27.4 million in capacity transfer revenues to ratepayers
     concurrent with this FPPAC period.  We take this action only to
     the extent necessary to avoid an injustice to ratepayers and a
     windfall to shareholders. 
     1.(B)  Rate Agreement Breach  
               In its testimony and its post hearing brief, Staff
     raised a number of concerns it characterized as a "potential
     breach" of the Rate Agreement.  After reviewing the testimony of
     both Staff and PSNH, the Rate Agreement and the attendant Sharing
     Agreement, and Order No. 19,889 in DR 89-244 approving the Rate
     Agreement, Re Northeast Utilities/Public Service Company of New
     Hampshire, 114 PUR4th 385, 75 NH PUC 396 (1990), we have
     concluded that NU has engaged in a course of conduct which could
     be characterized as a breach of the Rate Agreement.
               Pursuant to Section 3 of the Rate Agreement, NU agreed
     to provide PSNH's capacity needs, should they arise, for a period
     of ten years following the First Effective Date under a Capacity
     Transfer Agreement.  The Rate Agreement provides that this
     Capacity Transfer Agreement is designed to "assure an adequate
     supply of electric service to the ratepayers of New Hampshire . .
     . ."  Rate Agreement at D-7-D-8.  The executed agreement provides
     that NU will "at all times operate and maintain" the pledged
     generating units "in accordance with good electric utility
     practice."  Capacity Transfer Agreement (CL&P to PSNH) at
     Paragraph 3.  The Agreement also provides that NU will,
     "consistent with good electric utility practice . . . use
     reasonable efforts to assure that the [pledged Units] are
     operable at their applicable winter or summer Normal Claimed
     Capability Rating."  Id.     
               The nuclear generating stations, Millstone Units I, II,
     and III, comprise approximately 40% of the capacity pledged to
     PSNH by NU under this Capacity Transfer Agreement.  Rate
     Agreement, Appendix F at D-112.  The three Millstone Units have
     not operated for over eighteen months because of their failure to
     meet the requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
     Both internal and external investigations of the cause of these
     outages indicate they are the result of management negligence at
     the highest levels of the NU organization.  The three Units can
     no longer be claimed for capacity purposes and there is no clear
     indication that Unit I will ever return to service or that Units
     II and III will return to service soon.  
               We believe there is a prima facie showing that NU's
     operation and maintenance of the Millstone Units has failed to
     live up to the language and intent of this Capacity Transfer
     Agreement.  This leads us to question whether the State of New
     Hampshire may have been deprived of one of the fundamental
     benefits negotiated under the Rate Agreement.  Tr. at 107-110.
     (November 14, 1997)  
               Pursuant to Section 4 of the Rate Agreement, NU
     committed to enter into an agreement with PSNH "pursuant to which
     NU will credit [PSNH] with 50 percent of any . . . energy savings
     received under NEPOOL rules resulting from the combined operation
     of the NU system and [PSNH]."  Rate Agreement at D-10.  In a data
     response to a Staff interrogatory in this proceeding, NU/PSNH
     indicated that the changes to the NEPOOL agreement currently
     pending before the FERC would render the Sharing Agreement
     meaningless under the revised NEPOOL agreement pending approval
     before the FERC.  Ex. 32, at 13-14.  Our own review of NU/PSNH's
     response to that data request confirms Staff's testimony; the
     Sharing Agreement as it relates to energy savings and capacity is
     meaningless.  Ex. 32, Att. MDC-6.  Given NU's membership and
     status in NEPOOL, and the information and control that flow from
     that station, we find the failure of NU/PSNH to meet with the
     State to discuss the reformation of NEPOOL and its effect on the
     Sharing Agreement, under both the current regulatory regime and
     in a restructured environment, disturbing. 
               The Sharing Agreement explicitly provides that
     
          [u]pon the determination that any term or other
               provision is invalid, illegal or incapable of being
               enforced, the parties shall negotiate in good faith to
               modify this Agreement so as to effect their original
               intent as closely as possible . . . .
                 
     Sharing Agreement, at Section 11(c).    
               While we understand the proposed changes to NEPOOL are
     necessary to implement the restructuring of the electric industry
     and that the restructuring of the industry would render these
     agreements, which address generation, meaningless, we are also
     cognizant that there will be some period of time during which
     bundled rates remain the status quo.  Thus, to the extent the
     current regulatory regime remains in place, i.e., to the extent
     PSNH and the Initial System continue to own generation and
     generation continues to be bundled with transmission and
     distribution services, the NEPOOL Agreement and the Sharing
     Agreement and the economic assumptions underlying those
     agreements as originally crafted remain. 
               Again, we believe NU/PSNH's failure to meet with the
     State to discuss the ramifications of the changes in the NEPOOL
     agreement and to discuss NU's positions and input into the
     proposed changes to the NEPOOL agreement may have deprived the
     ratepayers of New Hampshire the benefits negotiated under the
     Rate Agreement.
               The final issue relates to NU's filing of a "network
     transmission service" tariff at the FERC that replaced PSNH's and
     the Initial System's stand-alone transmission tariffs.  The
     testimony revealed that PSNH ratepayers are annually losing
     millions of dollars in transmission revenues to the NU Initial
     System as a result of this new transmission tariff.  
               The loss of revenues results from the fact that NU has
     treated the filing of the network transmission tariff as
     terminating those provisions of the Sharing Agreement and its
     attendant Capacity Transfer Agreements that provided for the
     payment to PSNH of transmission fees for the use of PSNH
     transmission facilities.  It is telling to note that NU still
     charges PSNH, and thereby PSNH's ratepayers, transmission fees
     for similar transmission services that flow from PSNH to
     Connecticut and Massachusetts.
               NU failed to abide by the terms of the Sharing
     Agreement that required it to meet with the State and in good
     faith attempt to reform the agreements to retain the economic
     benefits to New Hampshire ratepayers for the use of the PSNH
     transmission system.  Again, we believe this behavior has
     resulted in New Hampshire ratepayers losing the benefit of the
     bargains constructed within the Rate Agreement, the Sharing
     Agreement and the Capacity Transfer Agreements.
               With regard to all three of these issues, we believe
     the Attorney General's Office should investigate this course of
     conduct and take the appropriate action.  We are concerned not
     only with the overall failure of NU to communicate with the State
     concerning the restructuring of NEPOOL as it relates to a
     restructured electric industry, but with the immediate economic
     consequences of that failure on PSNH ratepayers prior to the
     emergence of a competitive power market.      
     2.   Treatment of "EA" Costs Following the Fixed Rate Period
               The "EA" component of FPPAC was designed to allow for
     an increase in rates above the projected seven annual 5.5%
     increases in rates during the Fixed Rate Period under certain
     extraordinary circumstances.  One of the delineated circumstances
     was an increase in annual operation and maintenance expenses of
     at least $2 million or a capital expenditure of at least $20
     million due to new environmental regulations.  In DR 95-068 we
     determined, with qualifications, that PSNH's expenditures to
     comply with the CAAA had met the criteria for recovery of the
     costs of compliance under paragraph "EA".  
     
               The conclusion of the Fixed Rate Period, which
     prevented PSNH from recovering these costs through a base rate
     proceeding, and PSNH's pending base rate proceeding led Staff to
     recommend that these costs now be collected through base rates in
     accordance with customary cost of service regulatory practice. 
               We concur with Staff that operation and maintenance
     expenses and capital costs of generating facilities that were
     recovered through the FPPAC paragraph "EA" during the Fixed Rate
     Period and that are traditionally treated as base rate items
     should now be recovered through base rates following a base rate
     proceeding.  With regard to incremental increases in costs
     associated with the CAAA that occur between base rate
     proceedings, we will address that issue when and if the issue
     becomes ripe. 
     3.   Best Efforts 
               Pursuant to Section 12 of the Rate Agreement, NU/PSNH
     agreed to use its best efforts to renegotiate the rates paid to
     thirteen of the State's largest and most expensive SPPs.  There
     has been no determination, as yet, by the Commission as to
     whether PSNH has met its best efforts obligations under Section
     12 with regard to eleven of the SPPs.  See, DR 96-148.    
     
               In reaction to PSNH's allegations in the temporary rate
     proceeding in DR 97-059 that any decrease in rates might force
     PSNH into bankruptcy, and because of concerns relative to the
     financial viability of PSNH's affiliates and its parent caused by
     the Millstone nuclear outages, Staff and the OCA argued that the
     Commission should defer recovery by PSNH of some portion of both
     past and projected SPP costs.  Staff and the OCA argued that a
     deferral was necessary to ensure that ratepayers are adequately
     protected from an NU or PSNH bankruptcy should the Commission
     ultimately conclude that NU/PSNH failed to meet its best efforts
     obligations. 
               We do not believe a deferral mechanism is necessary to
     protect ratepayers at this time.  PSNH has already deferred
     recovery of approximately $200 million in SPP costs.  Thus, if
     the Commission were to determine that NU/PSNH had not met its
     best efforts obligations under Section 12 of the Rate Agreement
     and that ratepayers had been harmed by that failure, any damages
     could be recouped through the disallowance of deferral recovery.  
     4.   Light Loading 
               The Commission opened DR 96-149 on its own motion on
     May 14, 1996 to investigate concerns that PSNH was purchasing
     power from SPPs during periods of "light loading" when such
     purchases should have been curtailed under state and federal law. 
     In this docket, Staff and the Office of the Governor questioned
     PSNH's purchases from SPPs in light load situations and
     recommended the deferral of recovery of SPP costs when PSNH
     should have curtailed purchases.
               PSNH bears the burden of establishing the
     reasonableness of the rates it seeks to collect from customers. 
     Based on the testimony of Messrs. McCluskey, Cannata and
     Staszowski, we believe there has been a prima facie showing that
     PSNH has failed to comply with federal law and the terms of the
     Commission's rate orders regarding periods when SPP purchases are
     not required.   
               We reach this conclusion based in large part on PSNH's
     inability to provide this Commission with the information and
     documentation necessary to substantiate its assertions regarding
     negative avoided costs.  Thus, we have concluded that we will
     defer PSNH's recovery of $10 million, half the amount PSNH
     indicated it was overpaying SPPs during periods of light load in
     DR 94-080.  In the event PSNH can establish it has acted in
     accordance with the FERC rules implementing the Public Utilities
     Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) and the rate orders applying the
     FERC rules, it will be allowed to recover these funds.   
     
     5.   Unit II Parts
               In DR 94-172, PSNH, NAESCo, NAECo and the Commission
     Engineering Staff supported the creation of an imprudence
     mitigation fund.  The proposed fund would be based on the value
     that Unit II parts to PSNH ratepayers.  The OCA and the
     Commission Finance Staff argued that the proposal was
     inappropriate because PSNH ratepayers were already paying for
     Unit II parts through the Seabrook Power Contract.  
               Finance Staff and the OCA based their position on the
     fact that the Rate Agreement allocated $700 million to all of
     PSNH's interest in Seabrook Units I and II.  Thus, when the
     entire $700 million was allocated to Unit I under the Seabrook
     Power Contract, ratepayers were already compensating shareholders
     for any investment in Unit II parts.  
               PSNH, NAESCo and NAECo responded that they had not
     recovered any of the "preserve and protect" costs for Unit II
     parts since the inception of FPPAC and that FPPAC did not
     explicitly provide for recovery of those costs.  They also
     claimed that the regulatory treatment by the Commission up to
     that time, which allowed NAECo to recover the book value of Unit
     II parts placed into service in Unit I under the Seabrook Power
     Contract, established that Unit II parts were shareholder
     property.
               In rejecting the proposed imprudence mitigation fund,
     we implicitly concurred with the position of PSNH, NAESCo and
     NAECo by allowing the practice of charging ratepayers for Unit II
     parts to continue.  We did not, however, explicitly rule on the
     contention by PSNH, NAESCO and NAECo that Unit II parts are the
     sole property of shareholders.
               In this proceeding, the OCA explicitly requested that
     we address the issue of the appropriate regulatory treatment of
     Unit II parts.  Specifically, the OCA requested that we return to
     ratepayers NAECo's percentage of the profit from the sale of the
     Unit II steam generators.
               We believe the OCA has raised a valid issue that was
     not completely addressed in DR 94-172.  Because this issue goes
     well beyond the Unit II steam generators and might require
     adjustments to NAECo's books for Unit II parts placed in service
     in Unit I over the past seven years, the appropriate compensation
     to NAESCO for inventory maintenance and further refunds to
     ratepayers because of other sales of Unit II parts, this issue
     should be addressed in a separate docket.  Thus, we will open an
     investigation into the appropriate treatment of Unit II parts.  
     
     6.   Pollution Control Revenue Bonds
               Prior to the divestiture of its Seabrook assets to
     NAECo, PSNH borrowed approximately $500 million through PCRBs
     issued by the BFA.  At the time of their issuance, $287.5 million
     of the PCRB's were accorded tax exempt status.  Subsequently
     another $119 million of PCRBs obtained tax exempt status during
     the Fixed Rate Period.  The tax exempt status of the bonds
     significantly lowers their interest rates and, thereby, the cost
     of debt to the obligor.  
               To qualify for PCRB tax exempt status, an entity must
     demonstrate to the IRS that the proceeds of the bonds will be
     used for very specific "qualifying facilities".  When the BFA
     issued the $500 million of PCRBs, the proceeds of which were
     pledged to PSNH, the qualifying facilities were all associated
     with pollution control at Seabrook Station.  At the time of the
     divestiture of Seabrook assets and liabilities to NAECo, however,
     PSNH did not divest these bonds with their attendant low interest
     rates to NAECo but, rather, maintained the bonds within the
     capital structure of PSNH.
               Because PSNH was under a form of price cap regulation
     during the Fixed Rate Period, rather than cost of service
     regulation, PSNH shareholders received the entire benefit of the
     lower interest rate PCRBs during the seven year Fixed Rate
     Period.  If, however, PSNH had transferred the PCRBs to NAECo,
     along with the rest of the Seabrook assets and liabilities, at
     the time of the Seabrook divestiture all of the debt savings
     would have been passed on to PSNH ratepayers under the cost of
     service Seabrook Power Contract which flows through the FPPAC
     rate.  Thus, during the Fixed Rate Period, PSNH ratepayers would
     have paid millions of dollars less than was actually incurred
     through the FPPAC rate.  Following the Fixed Rate Period, PSNH
     ratepayers' share in the benefit of reduced debt costs through
     reduced costs are reflected in PSNH's capital structure used in
     cost of service regulation or the carrying costs ratepayers must
     bear for PSNH's uneconomic assets or stranded costs.
               CRR alleges, inter alia, that NU/PSNH never disclosed
     to the General Court and the Commission that it intended to
     finance the PSNH takeover with tax exempt PCRBs and that the
     interest rate benefits from the bonds would be retained by
     shareholders during the Fixed Rate Period.  To remedy this
     situation, CRR has requested that the Commission impute the tax
     exempt interest rates of the PCRBs to NAECo for the purposes of
     the Seabrook Power Contract, which would result in a multi-million dollar refund to PSNH ratepayers.  
               For the following reasons, we decline to take such
     action.  In December, 1989, NU filed its petition initiating the
     Commission's review of NU's acquisition plan of PSNH pursuant to
     RSA 362-C and its approved bankruptcy reorganization plan.  Along
     with the petition, NU filed testimony supporting the acquisition
     plan.  The testimony of Robert Busch specifies that NU
     contemplated the possibility of retaining all outstanding PCRBs
     and seeking the issuance of millions of dollars of additional
     PCRBs to finance the acquisition.
               Furthermore, the Commission explicitly approved the
     issuance of additional PCRB financings, Re Northeast
     Utilities/Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 75 NH PUC 396,
     474-477 (1990), and the record reveals that the Governor and
     Council also approved the issuance of additional PCRBs on August
     22, 1990.  The record further reveals that the Governor and
     Council were apprised by PSNH that the benefits of the bonds
     would not flow to ratepayers until the conclusion of the Fixed
     Rate Period.
     
     
     7.   Replacement Power Costs Incurred as a Result of Outages
          at Vermont Yankee, Maine Yankee, and Connecticut Yankee.
     
               In this proceeding, Staff argued that replacement power
     costs incurred as a result of outages at the Vermont Yankee,
     Maine Yankee and Connecticut Yankee nuclear power plants should
     be disallowed because the outages were the result of imprudence. 
               The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that when a
     utility has exhibited inefficiency, improvidence, economic waste,
     abuse of discretion, or action inimical to the public interest,
     costs incurred may not be passed on to ratepayers.  Appeal of
     Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, 125 N.H. 708 (1985).  The
     prudence standard is one of the specific standards that has been
     developed by the Court to govern the inclusion or exclusion of
     such costs for ratemaking purposes.  Appeal of Conservation Law
     Foundation, 127 N.H. 606, 637 (1986).   Prudence is "essentially
     ...an analogue of the common law negligence standard" requiring a
     utility to exercise due care in its activities.  Id.  The test of
     due care asks what a reasonable person would do under the
     circumstances existing at the time of a decision.  Fitzpatrick v.
     Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 101 N.H. 35 (1957).  See
     generally, Re Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 81 NH PUC
     531 (1996).  We will apply this standard to the nuclear outages
     at issue herein.
               As a result of an employee's failure to follow proper
     procedures, Vermont Yankee experienced an unplanned outage. PSNH
     does not contest that a Vermont Yankee employee acted
     negligently, or imprudently, causing the plant to come down and
     that negligence caused PSNH to incur $14,000 in replacement power
     costs.  PSNH argued, however, and Staff conceded, that the
     employee had been adequately trained.  PSNH further argued that
     since "management" was not responsible for the outage,
     shareholders should not be penalized through a disallowance of
     the replacement power costs.  
               It is a fundamental principle of law of agency that a
     master is responsible for the damages caused by the negligence of
     its agent.  See,  Restatement of the Law of Agency, Second  2,
     216.  We believe this is an appropriate and equitable result. 
     Thus, we will hold PSNH responsible for the imprudence of its
     agent and disallow recovery of the $14,000 in replacement power
     costs. 
               On December 5, 1996, Maine Yankee experienced an
     unscheduled outage because the manual reactor trip buttons were
     declared "inoperable" when it was discovered that the wires that
     operated each of the redundant systems were located too close to
     one another to meet technical specifications.  Although it only
     took one day to correct the cabling for the manual reactor trip
     buttons, the discovery of this cable separation problem in the
     control room led to the investigation and discovery of a number
     of other cable separation problems throughout the plant.  
               Further, because of the discovery of the problem with
     the manual reactor trip buttons, the NRC, through Generic Letter
     96-01, ordered the plant to look at all circuits for operability. 
     That investigation uncovered 10 to 20 other circuits that did not
     meet current standards for cable separation.  This led the NRC to
     place Maine Yankee on Watch List, Category 2 because of general
     maintenance problems at the plant.  On December 18, 1996, the NRC
     also issued a confirmatory action letter to Maine Yankee
     requiring the plant to remain off-line until all problems
     identified to date had been resolved.  
               The confirmatory action letter specifically required
     the following actions by Maine Yankee:
          (1)complete the initial Generic Letter 96-01 review;
               (2)develop a plan and methodology for expanding the
               review to determine the extent of the cable separation
               problem, and to disposition the issues in accordance
               with the unit's design basis; (3)perform a root cause
               analysis that would address all hardware deficiencies
               identified and use the information to validate the
               "comprehensiveness" of the corrective actions; and (4)
               meet with the NRC to present the results and actions.   
     
     Ex. 46 at 16
               Because of the extensive planning and work required to
     resolve these issues, Maine Yankee determined it would take
     advantage of the required shut down to refuel the plant.  At the
     same time, plant management began to review the economic
     viability of the plant.  On August 6, 1997, the Maine Yankee
     Board of Directors voted to retire or decommission the Maine
     Yankee Nuclear power plant.
               Staff argued that all replacement power costs incurred
     from December 6, 1996, to August 6, 1997, should be disallowed
     because the costs incurred were the result of the imprudent
     operation and maintenance of the plant.  PSNH argued that Maine
     Yankee prudently initiated a refueling of the plant while
     addressing the cable separation issues and other problems
     identified by the NRC.  Therefore, the Commission should not
     disallow any replacement power costs incurred after the refueling
     of the plant commenced.
               Based on the testimony of Mr. Kokoszka that Maine
     Yankee had numerous opportunities to correct its cable separation
     problems beginning as early as the fire at Brown's Ferry in the
     mid-1970s to two required re-examinations of these problems in
     the early 1990s, we find the outage to be the result of the
     imprudent operation and maintenance of the plant and will
     disallow all replacement power costs resulting from the outage
     until the determination by management to retire the plant. 
     Replacement power costs incurred between December 6, 1996 and
     August 6, 1997, therefore, are disallowed. 
               In July, 1996, Connecticut Yankee experienced an
     unscheduled outage to effect repairs to the CAR fan systems.  The
     CAR fans were declared inoperable when the plant's supply vendor,
     Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse), issued a letter
     to all plants of the same design as Connecticut Yankee stating
     that the structural integrity of the service water cooling system
     could not be ensured under certain operating conditions.    Westinghouse identified the potential problem in April of 1996 at
     Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant, a sister plant to Connecticut
     Yankee, and in June of 1996 officially notified all plants of
     this design of the potential problem.  In July of 1996
     independent contractors retained by Connecticut Yankee advised
     that the plant be brought down to effect repairs to the CAR fans. 
     On July 22, 1996, the Plant was brought down to effect the
     repairs to the CAR fans.  
               On August 9, 1996 management decided to move up the
     refueling outage that had been planned for September to coincide
     with the repairs to the CAR fan system.  On August 17, 1996, the
     plant officially went into the refueling mode, which was
     scheduled to last 52 days.  On October 9, 1996, the Connecticut
     Yankee Board of Directors announced that the preliminary results
     of an economic analysis of the continued operation of the plant
     indicated that the permanent shutdown of the Plant was likely. By
     October 9, 1996, the plant was no longer in the refueling mode,
     which would have been complete by that time but for the ongoing
     economic analysis of the plant.  On December 4, 1996, the
     Connecticut Yankee Board of Directors made the final decision to
     permanently retire the plant.      
               We find that the plant was prudently brought off-line
     to repair the CAR fans and that the decision to refuel the plant
     in August while repairs were effected to CAR fans was a prudent
     decision.  Ratepayers should not, however, bear any costs for
     replacement power beyond October 9, 1996, when the plant would
     have completed refueling but for the preliminary decision to
     retire the plant.  Ratepayers should not bear the costs incurred
     for replacement power while management considered whether or not
     it was in its best economic interest to retire the plant.  Thus,
     we will disallow all replacement power costs incurred between
     October 9, 1996 and December 4, 1996.
     8.   Merrimack and Schiller Stations' Coal Pile Reconciliation
               By letter dated December 3, 1997, Staff provided the
     Commission with PSNH's final reconciliation for the coal
     inventories at Merrimack and Schiller Stations and the
     appropriate revenue adjustments associated with the
     reconciliations.  The letter indicated that PSNH, the OCA and
     Staff had concluded that the final reconciliation of the coal
     inventories and the associated revenue adjustments were the
     appropriate revenue adjustments to be used in calculating the
     FPPAC rate.
               Given that the OCA raised this issue, and both Staff
     and the OCA, along with PSNH, concurred that the reconciliation
     filed with the Commission on December 3, 1997, appropriately
     reflected the coal pile inventories and the corresponding
     adjustments to revenue, we will accept the proposed adjustments
     as just and reasonable.    
     9.   Seabrook Station Science Center
               As PSNH correctly noted, this issue has previously been
     addressed by the Commission wherein it was determined that the
     Science Center was in fact used and useful in the generation of
     electricity.  See, Re Public Service Company of New Hampshire,  
     65 NH PUC 251, 259 (1980); Re Public Service Company of New
     Hampshire, 72 NH PUC 485, 492 (1987) ("Education Center" allowed
     in rates).  
               We do not believe the record in this case is adequate
     to disallow the expenses of the Science and Nature Center.  We
     believe there was sufficient testimony to establish that the
     Science and Nature Center is used for utility business purposes.  
     10.  Appropriate Methodology for Calculating Replacement Power   Cost Incurred as a Result of Imprudence
     
               PSNH has requested that we reconsider the decision in   
     DR 96-077 in which we indicated that the use of a net economic
     detriment test to determine levels of replacement power
     disallowances for imprudent operation of a generating station was
     inappropriate.  Re Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 81 NH
     PUC 531, 545 (1996).  We decline to reconsider that decision and
     reiterate that we do not believe it is appropriate to offset the
     costs incurred because of the negligent operation of a generating
     unit with the revenues garnered as a result of that negligence
     from the sale of excess power.  Our position is particularly
     appropriate where ratepayers have been required to cover all of
     the costs incurred by shareholders to own, operate and maintain
     the excess capacity used to generate that power.  
               Furthermore, as indicated in DR 96-077, each act must
     be viewed discretely.  To do otherwise would potentially obscure
     the result of management's imprudence. Id.  
     11.  Appropriate Calculation of "BA" Following the 
          Fixed Rate Period
     
               The "BA" component, or "Base Assumptions", of the FPPAC
     formula was intended to correct the FPPAC rate for those fuel and
     purchased power expenses incurred by PSNH that were being
     collected in base rates pursuant to PSNH's last traditional rate
     proceeding before filing for bankruptcy protection.  Rate
     Agreement, at D-92.  The Rate Agreement specified the exact
     amount of the BA component of FPPAC for each year of the seven
     years of the Fixed Rate Period.  Rate Agreement, at D-106.  The
     Rate Agreement did not, however, specify BA for the years
     following the Fixed Rate Period, although FPPAC is specified to
     run for three years beyond the Fixed Rate Period.  Thus, it is
     unclear what value should be assigned to BA in years eight
     through ten of FPPAC.
     
               We believe the Rate Agreement contemplated a base rate
     filing following the Fixed Rate Period to address PSNH earnings
     following seven years of price cap regulation.  Therefore, there
     was no need to specify a number to represent the hypothetical
     level of fuel and purchased power expenses in the "BA" component
     of FPPAC in the Rate Agreement because the actual numbers would
     be available to the Commission as a result of the base rate
     proceeding.  
               Given that there is a base rate proceeding pending at
     this time, we will determine the level of fuel and purchased
     power expenses in base rates and reflect actual "BA" costs in
     FPPAC at the conclusion of the proceeding. 
     12.  Costs Associated with North Atlantic Energy Company's       Acquisition of Vermont Electric Generation and Transmission Cooperative, Inc.'s Share in Seabrook
     
               As is set forth above, PSNH's affiliate, NAECo,
     purchased VEG&T's 0.41259% share of Seabrook Station to resolve
     an issue in the VEG&T bankruptcy.  In DR 93-092, the Commission
     approved the purchase and a modification to the Seabrook Power
     Contract proposed by PSNH and the Attorney General's Office that
     provided for the recovery of that share of Seabrook from PSNH
     ratepayers.  Re Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 80 NHPUC
     74 (1995).  PSNH and the Attorney General agreed to increase the
     "BA" component of FPPAC to offset any rate increases that would
     result from this modification of the Seabrook Power Contract
     during the Fixed Rate Period.  Re Public Service Company of New
     Hampshire, 79 NH PUC 5, 7-8 (1994).  
               Because the Seabrook Power Contract Amendment did not
     increase rates during the Fixed Rate Period, it is not subject to
     the provisions of RSA 362-C:9.  Thus, the Amendment was not
     subject to legislative approval.
      13. Harbor Seals 
               During the course of the past year, seven harbor seals
     have been entrapped and died in the intake tunnels of the
     circulation water system which provides cooling water to Seabrook
     Station.  Testimony revealed that $118,000 had been expended this
     year attempting to remediate the problem and that management was
     attempting to find a design solution that would resolve the
     problem.  CRR objected to the recovery of any funds expended at
     Seabrook Station to remediate the problem with harbor seals
     because the problem resulted from a design flaw by the owners. 
               As was set forth in Section 7 above, the New Hampshire
     Supreme Court has held that when a utility has exhibited
     inefficiency, improvidence, economic waste, abuse of discretion,
     or action inimical to the public interest, costs incurred may not
     be passed on to ratepayers.  Appeal of Seacoast Anti-Pollution
     League, 125 N.H. 708 (1985).  The prudence standard is one of the
     specific standards that has been developed by the Court to govern
     the inclusion or exclusion of such costs for ratemaking purposes. 
     Appeal of Conservation Law Foundation, 127 N.H. 606, 637 (1986).      Prudence is "essentially ...an analogue of the common
     law negligence standard" requiring a utility to exercise due care
     in its activities.  Id.  The test of due care asks what a
     reasonable person would do under the circumstances existing at
     the time of a decision.  Fitzpatrick v. Public Service Co. of New
     Hampshire, 101 N.H. 35 (1957).  See generally, Re Public Service
     Company of New Hampshire, 81 NH PUC 531 (1996).
               The issue for our resolution, then, is whether there
     was a design flaw in the construction of the cooling tunnel
     intakes, such that a reasonable person of the requisite skill
     would have noted and corrected the flaw.  
               The testimony revealed that the cooling tunnel intakes
     were designed to minimize their environmental impact.  To achieve
     that goal, the intake structures were built very large to
     decrease the velocity of the water entering the tunnels so that
     fish would not become entrapped at the intake.  At the time of
     construction, harbor seals were much less prevalent in the Gulf
     of Maine and were not perceived as a potential problem.  In fact,
     it was 1993 before the first seal became entrapped in the
     tunnels.  It appears harbor seals are only recently venturing
     inside the intakes and once inside become entrapped in the
     tunnels.
               Applying the prudence standard set forth above to the
     design of the tunnel intakes, we cannot conclude that a
     reasonable person of requisite skill and experience would have
     modified the design in a manner to prevent the current problem
     with harbor seals.  Thus, we will not disallow the costs incurred
     as a result of seal entrapment or the cost of design
     modifications to address the situation. 
         14.  Miscellaneous
               Staff also raised a concern relative to PSNH's failure
     to timely answer questions and to answer questions completely. 
     Based on the record in this proceeding, we share Staff's concern. 
     It appears PSNH has been unresponsive to data requests.  We
     expect this practice to cease and direct PSNH to answer our
     Staff's and all parties' questions in a timely, thorough and
     comprehensive manner.
     
     
               Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby 
               ORDERED, that Public Service Company of New Hampshire
     credit ratepayers for the $27.4 million in capacity transfer
     revenues received from Connecticut Light and Power Company this
     FPPAC period; and it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that Public Service Company of New
     Hampshire meet with representatives of the State and the
     Commission to discuss those issues related to Joint Dispatch
     Savings, the Sharing Agreement and the Capacity Transfer
     Agreements under the current regulatory regime; and it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that the operation and maintenance
     expenses and capital costs of generating facilities that are
     traditionally treated as base rate items and are currently being
     recovered through the "EA" component of FPPAC may continue to be
     recovered through FPPAC until they are included in base rates in
     the pending base rate proceeding; and it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that there is no need for a best
     efforts deferral at this time; and it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that Public Service Company of New
     Hampshire defer recovery of $10 million in Small Power Producer
     costs this FPPAC period; and it is
     
               FURTHER ORDERED, that the Commission shall institute an
     investigation into the appropriate treatment of revenues from
     Unit II part sales, the maintenance costs of Unit II parts, the
     appropriate treatment of Unit II parts placed into service in
     Unit I; and it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that the retention of the Pollution
     Control Revenue Bonds in the capital structure of Public Service
     Company of New Hampshire was intended under the Rate Agreement;
     and it is      
               FURTHER ORDERED, that Public Service Company of New
     Hampshire shall not recover the $14,000 in replacement power
     costs incurred because of the imprudent outage at the Vermont
     Yankee nuclear power plant; and it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that Public Service Company of New
     Hampshire shall not recover the $2.9 million in replacement power
     costs incurred because of the imprudent outage at the Maine
     Yankee nuclear power plant; and it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that Public Service Company of New
     Hampshire shall not recover the $461,000 in replacement power
     costs incurred at the Connecticut Yankee nuclear power plant
     after October 9, 1996; and it is
     
               FURTHER ORDERED, that the Science and Nature Center is
     used for utility business purposes and the expenses of the
     Science and Nature Center may be recovered through the Seabrook
     Power Contract; and it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that it is inappropriate to offset the
     costs incurred because of the negligent operation of a generating
     unit with the revenues garnered as a result of that negligence
     from the sale of excess power; and it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that the "BA" component of FPPAC shall
     be calculated in accordance with the last year of the Fixed Rate
     Period until it is established in the base rate proceeding; and
     it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that we shall address the appropriate
     treatment of the modification of the Seabrook Power Contract to
     include the VEG&T share of Seabrook in the next FPPAC proceeding;
     and it is
               FURTHER ORDERED, that Seabrook Station's problem with
     harbor seals is not the result of imprudence.
               By order of the Public Utilities Commission of New 
     
     Hampshire this tenth day of February, 1998.
     
     
     
     
                                                                     
        Douglas L. Patch    Bruce B. Ellsworth        Susan S. Geiger
            Chairman           Commissioner            Commissioner
     
     Attested by:
     
     
     
                                      
     Thomas B. Getz
     Executive Director and Secretary